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Abstract. Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-
ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates 
and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory. He discusses 
the concept of a plan proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his praxio-
logy (theory of efficient action), and the so called “planning theory of 
intention” by Michael E. Bratman. The conceptual meeting of these two 
proposals helps to remove flaws in Kotarbiński’s action theory, it also 
shows the way, in which we can enrich the idea of plans in the frame-
work of intentions. Generally, praxiology occurs to be still an important 
perspective in action theory, which particularly shows how we can im-
prove our understanding of planning when confronted with influential 
contemporary accounts.
1. Introduction
Planning is a large part of our temporally extended agency. It orga-
nizes most of our actions which need to be prepared before execution. 
As Michael Bratman used to say, we are planning agents [e.g. Bratman 
2007: 3]. Naturally, this is not the whole story about our agency. We 
not only plan our actions – we get things done. So we are – and should 
be – effective creatures. For a practical being, there is almost pressure 
towards finalization, as H. J. Krämer put it2. Planning makes sense, be-
cause of its long-lasting effects on action. Indeed effectiveness would not 
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be possible – at least in many diachronic dimensions of human practice 
– without planning. My aim in this paper is to try to elucidate a little on 
this philosophical hint. To achieve this, I shall focus on the intersection 
between two approaches to planning: the one proposed in the so called 
planning theory of intention (henceforth PTI) by Bratman, and the one 
called praxiology (proposed by Kotarbiński) which is focused on human 
effectiveness. As we will see, both these two tactics work in the same 
business and – after a few critical modifications – may mutually support 
one another. Unhappily, these two approaches do not permit a comparison 
that would show this mutual cooperation easily. Before the attempt at 
bringing these accounts together, one needs to hermeneutically prepare 
both of them. I shall in particular focus on praxiology, since there are at 
least two reasons which make the task of interpreting it a demanding one: 
firstly, praxiology, especially in the sense in which I (after Kotarbiński) 
use this term, is not a widely known field of study. Secondly, there are 
internal theoretical peculiarities and difficulties (partially responsible 
for the fact that a wider international reception of praxiology had been 
impeded), which make it hard to accept. Thus, the aim of this paper can 
be also understood as a preparation of praxiology for its meeting with 
the planning theory of intention (but, as we shall see, such preparation 
can also take the opposite direction). PTI has been widely discussed from 
many different aspects in the literature on action theory, while the same 
cannot be said about praxiology. Nevertheless, the possible theoretical 
outcome of their meeting promises something that seems to be neither 
noticed in the literature on the Bratmanian “planning theory”, nor – I dare 
to say – in international debates on action theory taken en bloc. 
The structure of this work is as follows. Firstly, I briefly explain how 
I understand praxiology and why it is still an important perspective 
in action theory. Here I present the core of the programme which was 
first proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński under the heading “praxiology”. 
Secondly, I present Kotarbiński’s understanding of plans. Here I point 
out, inter alia, the difficulties of his philosophical elaboration of the con-
cept of a plan, which make it obsolete, at least, in its overall theoretical 
framework. Thirdly, to put the praxiological discussion about plans on 
a more current and philosophically feasible track I briefly characterize 
the Bratmanian approach to plans as seen from the perspective of his 
theory of intentions. I present it as the most promising framework for 
praxiology (at least, for the concept of a plan, the account of which is an 
important part of praxiology). Since this characteristic initially reveals 
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its praxiological dimension, I try, in the fourth step, to explain in more 
detail why the Bratmanian approach to plans can be interpreted as a pra-
xiological one. The fifth section is a critical discussion of Kotarbińskian 
views on plans in the light of the results gained from my deliberations 
in the previous parts of the essay. 
2. “What the hell is praxiology?”
Despite the implications of the above heading3, praxiology still seems 
to be important. It has quite a long tradition commonly associated with 
Ludwig von Mises (spelled in his writings as “praxeology”), but undo-
ubtedly, there are other interesting, non-Misesian proposals. At least two 
other roots of praxiology are noted – French and Polish (see Alexandre 
& Gasparski 1999). I shall not investigate the historical differences and 
similarities between them. The provenance of praxiology, as I understand 
it, is the Polish tradition established by the Polish philosopher Tadeusz 
Kotarbinski (Warsaw-Lvov School). In my opinion, Kotarbiński’s praxio-
logical work, developed in the 1950s, is not only much more analytically 
elaborated and nuanced than the French and Austrian accounts, but is – so 
far – the one and only truly philosophical example of praxiological thin-
king. Praxiology, in the sense which I accept, is a field of philosophical 
theorizing which: (1) has been consistently developed from the angle 
of human effectiveness and efficiency in action; (2) tries to describe the 
most basic and general conditions for such effectiveness and efficiency. 
Three definitions are in order here: 
Effectiveness1. : an action is effective when it leads to or helps lead to 
the result taken as its intended goal.
Efficiency2. : an action is efficient when it is effective and it is the most 
economic of the effective options available.
Economy3. : an action is the more economic the fewer mental and 
physical resources it requires to reach its goal4. 
Naturally, not all actions are interpretable in terms of efficiency and 
economy. Some of them may fulfil the condition of efficiency, but others 
may not. So praxiology should be a heterogenic discipline which is trying 
sensibly to account for the empirical context of actions. It can be descri-
bed as an action theory that aims to show general normative conditions 
of effectiveness and efficiency in action. Its aim is to show the way we 
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optimize our actions when meeting these conditions; so, when given these 
conditions, we may also predict whether we will succeed or fail5. So con-
strued, praxiology is not anything new – many action theorists are implicit 
praxiologists: action theories are volens nolens about our effectiveness and 
its conditions6. Nevertheless, praxiology is still an open project, precisely 
because the implicit approach to these conditions seems dominant. The 
talk of effectiveness and efficiency is rampant in contemporary practical 
sciences, to the extent that it is philosophically overwhelming, so it seems 
that praxiology should also be highly interesting and important for those 
who work outside the field of philosophy of action. It may offer wide-
ranging conclusions that may be useful for moral thinkers, legal theorists, 
economists, game and decision theorists, or cognitive psychologists, among 
others. Before I say something critical about it (in a positive or negative 
sense), a brief presentation of what it is, is in order.
Praxiology, to satisfactorily explain the normative conditions of hu-
man effectiveness and efficiency, has to give an account of both simple 
individual actions and of shared/cooperative agency; it has to explore 
both descriptive concepts referring to action (in praxiological ontology, 
where elementary concepts are explained: action, event, individual and 
shared agency, agent, goal, result, etc.), and typically evaluative language 
of action (praxiological value theory, including inter alia effectiveness, 
economy, skill, etc.). These accounts are to be consequently formulated 
from the angle of theoretical knowledge which could improve the sphere 
of praxis via an account of praxiological norms (preparation, agglome-
ration of goals, automation, among others)7. Kotarbinski called these 
competences of praxiology “the grammar of action”. In what follows, 
I discuss the original structure of his praxiology in more detail (Makow-
ski, unpublished); here I shall focus on selected problems of plans, which 
in nuce show all the dimensions of praxiology (ontological, evaluative, 
and normative). As I pointed out at the beginning, the philosophical hint 
is that planning – which is an organizer of our diachronic agency – is one 
of the ways in which we make our actions both effective and efficient. 
Praxiology aims to give an optimizing account of agency. This, toge-
ther with the orientation towards effectiveness and efficiency, means that 
praxiology is interestingly close to the idea that we are resource-bounded 
agents (proposed by Herbert Simon). This is especially noticeable in the 
account of planning. But before trying to understand this idea here, we 
need to know what plans are and how praxiology proves that planning 
is the way we organize our diachronic actions.
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3. Kotarbiński on plans (1): a “dottle” of reism in praxiology
Let us begin with some brief historical and hermeneutical re-
marks. Kotarbiński paid philosophical attention to plans long before 
they entered the still vivid debates on action theory and artificial 
intelligence. His account was developed originally in the mid 50s. 
and early 60s. of the 20th century and presented in two papers 
[English editions: Kotarbiński 1962a, 1983] and in his 1955 opus 
magnum Treatise on Good Job [edited in English as Praxiology, 
Kotarbiński 1965]. Kotarbiński was aware that plans were of the 
first importance in practical thinking. One of his papers started with 
the statement: “The concept of plans is coloured with the tincture 
of topicality” [Kotarbiński 1983: 15]. Before clarifying why plans 
are topical in the sense used by the Polish philosopher, let me shed 
some light on how he understood them. The word ‘plan’ is ambi-
guous, which means it has at least two senses. On the one hand, it 
characterizes a planner, her state of mind – in the sense of ‘having 
a plan’. It is a psychological concept. Let us call the account which 
defines plans in this way: Plan Internalism (henceforth – PI). On the 
other hand, ‘plan’ can be a linguistic expression [Kotarbiński 19612a: 
193] or an external description understood as a complex sign, a per-
ceptible image (Kotarbiński said “an icon”) of planning, for example: 
a set of written sentences. It is an ontological concept. A plan in this 
sense is not necessarily accompanied by a plan as a mental state. Call 
it Plan Externalism (PE) [see Kotarbiński 1983: 19–21]. Now, which 
of these two, PI and PE, seems to be more viable in action theory?
To answer this question, we need to allow for Kotarbiński’s onto-
logical and semantic views. The Polish praxiologist was a proponent 
of the so called “reism” (or concretism) in ontology; the semantic 
version of it consists of the distinction between genuine names and the 
so called “onomatoids” (apparent names). A name is genuine if and 
only if it refers to concrete spatio-temporal objects. No concrete object 
is a property, relation, or state of affairs. The latter are onomatoids – 
names which only allegedly refer to abstract entities: onomatoid is 
a name the referent of which does not exist8. It now becomes clear that 
plans according to PI do not exist (in the reistic sense), “plans” are only 
apparent names or vicarious phrases. Despite the fact that plans as men-
tal states are in common use in our practical language, they seem to be 
insignificant for ontological reasons:
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[W]henever somebody plans [something] we may correctly maintain that he 
makes a plan, devises a plan, considers a plan of his actions; however, it should 
be borne in mind that the function of the term plan, in this sense, is that of an 
onomatoid, hence it does not involve any commitment concerning the existence 
of any object called a plan. [Kotarbiński 1983: 22]
It is more than obvious that reism in action theory proposes a consequ-
ent PE: we should rather neglect our consideration of options, our mental 
aspects of intending and decision-making (a large dimension of agency) 
and put stress on their tangible results and effects in external world. Now, 
does PE save the reistic definition of plan in terms of genuine names? 
According to PE, plans exist only if an agent wants to communicate the 
action intentions – plans need to be created as external concreta, made 
available to other agents. Consider the definition of plans:
[A] plan is an icon of something intended which represents either temporal 
stages of its object, or the spatial structure of its contemporary parts, or the 
structure of its causally related constituents. Needless to say, components of the 
above alternative do not exclude one another and it is possible that a certain plan 
includes two or three of them jointly. Icons of the first kind are called temporal 
plans; for example, the programme of a concert belongs to them. [Kotarbiński 
1983: 22–23]
We see that such a definition embraces not only plans as mental atti-
tudes of intending in the form of sentences externalized “on paper”, but 
also things like recipes (of preparing a soup, for example) or schedules 
(like railway schedule), or architectural plans. So it is an extremely 
broad definition and extends beyond the standard spectrum of interests 
of action theory9. But, this problem aside, the PE-definition – though 
advisable by reism – bears with it problems in terms of reism itself. Take 
an architectural plan of a structure to be built. It is also an example of 
a plan in Kotarbiński’s terms. If the building is something intended to 
be constructed in the future, its plan is still “an image” of something 
nonexistent, or – an image of nothing. The definition of a plan is no lon-
ger reistic, but it has become nonfactualist10. Kotarbiński tried to solve 
this problem claiming that to say that a plan is an image of something 
intended is to say that “a plan shows what something intended will be like 
if our intentions are satisfied” [Kotarbiński 1983: 25, my italics]. This 
vulpine interpretive manoeuvre, stressing the praxiological importance 
of effectiveness (the talk of “satisfied” intentions), seems to secure reism, 
but actually, it only highlights the problem which is inherent in action 
 Praxiology meets Planning Theory of Intention 49
theory (at least in the sphere of our investigations): the inescapability of 
psychological concepts and intentional language as such. This definition 
shows that it is extremely difficult to talk about any effects of the mental 
aspects of planning without intentions. So, reism is a dead end in action 
theory, because it obfuscates the role of our agential psychology. That 
is why Kotarbińskian practical philosophy is highly problematic if not 
totally flawed11. Nevertheless, I am prone to say that the interpretation 
of the reistic definition of a plan offered by Kotarbiński is awry in the 
sense that it can be seen as an argument for PI. Plans as mental states 
causally and logically precede plans understood as external descriptions, 
so intentions and intending seem to be irreducible. That is why one may 
say: a plan shows what that which is intended will be like if it ends up 
being as we intended it to be12. In other places, Kotarbiński himself 
stressed that the analysis of plans understood as linguistic expressions 
remained in touch with the idea that planning was a psychological issue, 
and we were the planning agents [Kotarbiński 1961: 193]. Therefore, 
the point of the story about reism in action theory may be this: we can 
safely narrow down the concept of a plan to one of mental attitude, and 
redefine it in terms of intentions, or in other words – replace the reistic 
ontology with the framework of the philosophy of psychology.
4. To merge praxiology with PTI: 
plans as complex future-directed intentions13
We are looking for another conceptual framework for plans which 
would be compatible with PI. But, by suggesting this I do not mean 
to say that PE is flat-out wrong. There are fields of science where the 
external approach to plans is useful (e.g. abstract structures projected in 
AI [Bratman 1987: 29]. Nevertheless, in action theory where we consider 
the diachronic dimension of agency, PI seems to be much more feasible. 
If this is the case, PI should also be promising for the praxiological un-
derstanding of actions. Let us recall that planning, as a special case of 
mental activity, organizes our diachronic agency and is one of the ways 
in which we make our actions effective.
I stipulate that PTI which has been proposed by Michael E. Bratman 
offers the most attractive framework for a praxiological approach to 
planning. The whole idea of PTI is to use common-sense talk of plans 
to elucidate a specific type of intentions: future-directed ones. In turn, 
such a manoeuvre improves our common-sense understanding of plans 
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and shows their basic structure. So, PTI narrows down the scope of un-
derstanding plans to mental attitudes (or pro-attitudes if you like), which 
support – both intrapersonally, and interpersonally – the organization 
of our future actions [Bratman 1987: 18; 1992b: 2]. When, for example, 
I intend in January to go to California in April, I do not only express my 
desire to do so. I specifically commit myself to that and not another course 
of action. Such a commitment is, of course, revocable, depending on the 
changes in my present agential environment or simply – on a change in 
what I want. What about plans? 
My future-directed intention to fly to California in April cannot be 
instantly fulfilled. Such an intention diachronically structures at least 
a few actions: I need to include the trip into my work schedule, buy 
tickets, book hotel and so on. These actions have to be, at least in part, 
properly sequenced. This is how we make our plans. So, plans are similar 
to future-directed intentions, but are much more complex, because they 
embed other intentions.
Although Bratman occasionally identifies plans with future-directed 
intentions, I accept his official stance: intentions are “building blocks 
of plans” [Bratman 1987: 8]. or, they are “plan states” [Bratman 2010: 
9]. Plans are partial chains of intentions14. (This understanding of plans 
can be supported by Kotarbińskian talk about plans as sets of sentences 
[Kotarbiński 1961: 191]). Let us characterize them in more detail. Firstly, 
plans control our actions, because of their specific stability – the feature 
which they inherit from the stability of future-directed intentions15. If 
I intend now to go to California in April, the issue of going there is settled as 
a “default” option until the time of action. “If my future-directed intention 
manages to survive until the time of action, and I see that time has arrived 
and nothing interferes, it will control my action then.” [Bratman 1987: 
16]. This stability is not total: “given new information, or a change in 
what I want, I may well reopen the question and reconsider” [Bratman 
1987: 16]. Secondly, plans serve as an input for further reasoning about 
other intentions. The intention to go to California runs other intentions: 
to buy tickets, take care of accommodation, meet my friend there, and 
so on. Thirdly, plans are hierarchically structured. My intention to go 
to California constitutes a goal, it embeds relevant means, which can 
be understood as specific, sometimes interlocking, sub-plans. Fourthly, 
plans are also essentially partial: in January, when forming my plan to 
visit California in April, I do not have to care about all the sub-plans 
it requires to be filled out – say, the destination (San Francisco or LA) 
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or the booking of a hotel (in the Hilton or Sheraton) – such intentions 
can be formed later and gradually over time. Improving the details of 
a plan supports its effectiveness, but it is not a necessary condition of plan 
effectiveness [Bratman 1987: 179, n. 5] People may also make general 
“life plans” (in the sense of life strategies) which essentially cannot be 
planned all at once [Bratman 1987: 29–30])16. 
So, according to PTI, plans should be consequently understood as 
similar to future-directed intentions (“plans are intentions writ large” 
[Bratman 1987: 8] but different from them due to their complexity. To 
sum up: plans are complex chains of future-directed intentions, which: 
(1) are conduct-controllers (because of their stability), (2) are relatively 
stable, (3) serve as a further-reasoning-input, and (4) are hierarchically 
structured. No surprise, this characteristic ex definitione implies PI: 
PTI is an account of plans considered as a psychological issue. Thus, if 
a praxiological approach to plans is feasible, it should be feasible in 
terms of PTI (or something close to it). I have hinted that plans support 
our effectiveness in diachronic agency. I have also said (sect. 2), that 
proper praxiology involves an investigation of the normative conditions 
of effectiveness. I claim that PTI offers an account of such conditions – 
we will browse through them in the next section. In this way, it should 
become clear that praxiology can be – at least prima facie – merged 
with PTI, because Bratmanian action theory has a deeper praxiological 
dimension. To see this dimension, we need have a closer look at standards 
that plans should meet in our rational diachronic agency.
5. Bratman on plans: the minimal praxiology
Plans have to meet at least some of the regularities of our mental 
processes within which the building blocks of plans are moored. This is 
a heritage of functionalism in philosophy of mind in PTI17. Without going 
into details, it is enough to notice that these regularities can be understood 
as norms for future-directed intention18. Due to some difficulties [see e.g 
Kolodny 2008], a comprehensive discussion of these norms would require 
a very detailed study, here I shall focus just on their “face value”. 
According to Bratman, there are four types of norms of plans: inter-
nal and external consistency, means-end coherence, agglomeration and 
stability19. Let us begin with consistency. Intentions should be consistent 
internally, i.e. they should not contradict each other. Turn back to my 
plan to visit California and the way I fill in this plan with details: my 
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intention to visit San Francisco cannot be accompanied by my intention 
to meet friends in Warsaw at the same time – my plan would be then 
executed ineffectively (to say the least). Plans should also be consistent 
externally: they should be in accordance with my beliefs. I cannot intend 
to go to California in April if I believe that in April I will be in Krakow 
at my cousin’s wedding (because I have already accepted an invitation 
to attend it).
Planning means action organization. Besides being consistent, plans 
should be coherent with respect to the relation between the means and 
plan end. This demand on plans is related to their partial character and 
hierarchical structure. Effective plans embed relevant means: my plan to 
go to California would not be successful if I decided to go there by train 
(given the belief that I shall still be in Europe before I go). Nevertheless, 
the means I engage to reach my goal do not have to be set “down to the last 
physical detail” [Bratman 1987: 31]. The norm of means-end coherence 
should be sufficient to execute a plan, it does not force plan detail.
The norm of stability, the third in this presentation, is probably the 
most problematic in Bratman’s works. We have seen that stability is one 
of the descriptive features of plans and intentions. Here it is to serve as 
a norm. What is the difference? Its core seems to be anchored in the idea 
of reasonable stability. In contrast to intention stability understood as 
a default practical option after decision-making (called by early Bratman 
also “intertia”)20, stability as a norm should be reasonable [Bratman 1987: 
72]. It can be defined as the result of an assessment of the agent’s attitude 
over time, in a particular case. To elucidate this norm, Bratman engages 
the so called “two-tier approach to non-reflective (non)reconsideration” 
[Bratman 1987: 64–71, see also Holton 2004: 510], which is a model 
of rationality of an agent. The first tier is responsible for the pragmatic 
disposition not to reconsider prior intentions, i.e. it relies on the intention 
stability described as a “default” – the feature which intentions inherit 
from the more general psychological tendencies not to reconsider prior 
decisions. At the second tier, we assess particular situations from the 
angle of the reasonableness of this “defaultness”: “We may then say that 
nonreflective (non)reconsideration of a prior intention was rational of 
S if it was the manifestation of general habits of reconsideration that were 
reasonable of S to have”. [Bratman 1987: 65]. So, the norm of stability 
is more complex than consistency and coherence. Its particular shape 
depends on context and circumstances. We should also bear in mind that, 
given the Bratmanian occasional identification of intentions with plans, 
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the norm of stability applies uniformly to plans with no modifications 
[see. Bratman 1987: 65]: plans should be as stable as future-directed 
intentions should be.
Notice also that despite its overall importance for the effectiveness 
of diachronic agency, stability as described by Bratman does not have 
a universal application. Bratman deliberately narrows his account down 
to the situations in which we either retain or reconsider prior intentions21. 
But it seems that there are many cases where these two do not exhaust the 
problem of agential stability – all of them rely on abandoning intentions 
without reconsideration. What about my overall psychological stability, 
if I have to abandon my plan to visit California, simply because, say, the 
airlines are on strike? Unfortunately, Bratman does not say much about 
such cases of stability and leaves this aspect of our planning untouched. 
It even seems that the picture of psychological stability (“two-tier mo-
del”) should embrace such cases on a par with the standard situations of 
intention retention and reconsideration22. This line of thinking appears 
justified in the light of further theoretical support which Bratman gives 
to stability. He refers to three ideas: (1) “the snow-ball effect” of inten-
tions: acting on prior intentions changes the world in a way that escalates 
the agent’s sensibility of continuing to act on the basis of that intention, 
(2) the costs of reconsideration by resource-limited agents: there are 
reasons not to reconsider prior intentions, because it takes time, requires 
mental costs and resources. This support can be interpreted as an exten-
sion of the idea of resource-boundedness. Finally, (3) general propensities 
favouring non-reconsideration: our psychological dispositions to retain 
prior intentions support our effectiveness [Bratman: 2010: 12–13]. Sta-
bility, according to Bratman, is not only a crucial norm of planning, but 
it traces something very primal in the psychology of action – although 
Bratman’s elaboration of this seems to leave something to be desired.
Plans consolidate our temporally extended actions in various ways. 
The last norm of planning, detected by Bratman, is the agglomeration 
of intentions. If in one and the same time an agent intends A and intends 
B, then it should be possible for him/her to intend both A and B: “[t]here 
is rational pressure for an agent to put his various intentions together into 
a larger intention” [Bratman: 1987: 134]. If I intend to visit San Francisco 
in April to go there for a jazz concert and I intend to meet my friend in 
San Francisco, it is rational to have these intentions together. Such an 
agglomeration is a part of the normative net of our agential psychology: 
it comes with the constraint of internal and external consistency. In the 
54 Praxiology and the Reasons for Action: Broadening the Borders
case discussed, my intention to visit San Francisco and the intention to 
meet my friend are mutually consistent, and are consistent with my beliefs 
(say, I believe that my friend will be in SF in April, and our schedules are 
compatible). Intention agglomeration supports my overall effectiveness 
in a distinct manner.
Let us take stock. We have four mutually supporting norms of plans. 
The praxiological dimension of the Bratmanian approach to them is 
rather clear. The norms of planning are all implicitly oriented on the 
effectiveness of diachronic agency, and I pointed to this fact when pre-
senting each of these norms. A praxiologist would say that these norms 
are explicitly necessary conditions of effective diachronically organized 
actions. But immediately, the new praxiological question arises: are 
these conditions sufficient for their efficiency? What if the praxiology 
of PTI can be interpreted and enriched in a direction that would make 
it more optimal?
Consider now the intention agglomeration again. No doubt, Bratman 
remained minimal in his account of this norm, in the sense that his pre-
sentation of it was curt. In fact, some critics have already correctly noticed 
that Bratman has left this norm of planning without further elaboration 
and support [Zhu 2010]. Still, if we support it in a suitable way, we shall 
see that PTI is open to a more optimizing interpretation that clearly distin-
guishes effectiveness and efficiency. My plan to go to California embeds 
a few intentions which in some circumstances should be agglomerative. 
If I intend to visit San Francisco in April to go for a jazz concert and 
I intend to meet my friend in San Francisco, it is normally reasonable 
for me to have both these intentions agglomerated. But there are two 
conditions for this reasonableness. Firstly, these intentions have to “play 
in the same game” (to put it in a metaphor): they need to be related in 
a significant manner in the same practical scenario23. Secondly, intending 
both to visit SF to go for a concert there and to meet my friend in SF has 
to be more economic than the intending of these two separately (in two 
individual planning scenarios). I would need another plan (engaging 
new relevant resources) to meet my friend in San Francisco, if my plan 
to visit California (with the intention to attend a concert in SF) were not 
already in place. Agglomerating (or clustering) future-directed intentions 
in one larger “amalgam” or compound intention simplifies and eases our 
actions. In this way, we economize our planning agency24. And this is 
something more than the standard effectiveness-oriented interpretation 
of PTI offers, since the conditions of being effective are not always the 
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conditions of being efficient. It appears that praxiology helps to under-
stand PTI better.
We have seen that Bratman stayed parsimonious in his presentation 
of the norm of intention agglomeration, and, at the same time – that the 
norm itself can be seen as praxiologically distinguished. Still, there is 
another reason why Bratmanian PTI can be understood as a minimal 
praxiology. I have said that Bratman occasionally identified plans with 
future-directed intentions. So, according to his approach to PTI, the 
norms of plans have to be volens nolens restricted to the norms governing 
intentions. Naturally, it is possible that the underlying regularities of 
intentions and plans produce one and the same set of norms for both of 
them, but Bratman – due to the above mentioned identification – could 
not have shown this. This paves the way to answer the question I asked 
two paragraphs earlier: what if plans have to meet other praxiological 
standards, beyond the scope of standards for intentions? I urge to accept 
this option rather than the opposite one. To show how this option can 
be realized, we need to have a closer look at the optimal praxiology of 
planning which had been projected by Kotarbinski.
6. Kotarbiński on plans (2): 
planning from the perspective of PTI
The Kotarbińskian approach to plans, incompetently opting for PE 
in action theory, is free from the problem of identification of plans and 
future directed intentions. Prima facie, this gives Kotarbinski a sort of 
advantage over PTI: despite the fact, that his reistic conception of a plan 
is somewhat flawed, it might still be the case that his view on standards 
of plans could enrich or correct the account offered by Bratman. Let us 
check it.
Kotarbinski was perfectly aware that plans are conditions of action 
preparation [Kotarbiński 1961: 189]: “the planner must somehow mould 
himself” [Kotarbiński 1965: 117]. Planning pragmatizes agency. The 
norms of plans constitute a specific subclass of more general praxiological 
norms. Before I start to discuss the standards of plans in detail, a remark 
is in order. Kotarbiński, when proposing his account of plans, confused 
a few things. Even the titles of his works advise some caution. In all three 
works where he proposed his theory of plans, he very liberally used va-
rious terms to characterize them: a property, a feature, a value, a virtue, 
a postulate, a demand, a requirement, and a norm. It would be difficult, 
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without further amplification, to discuss things given such different names 
under the one heading of norm. Following Bratman’s distinction betwe-
en the descriptive characteristic of a plan and its normative constraints 
(norms), I shall try to distinguish these two in Kotarbiński. 
Despite the mentioned confusion, Kotarbinski, at first glance, seems to 
have a head start over Bratman. He offers not just four but a whole list of 
properties and norms of plans: purposefulness, feasibility (“workability”), 
internal consistency, rationality (“cognitive justification”), operativeness, 
plasticity (“flexibility”), (limited) detail, (limited) long-term, terminus 
ad quem, completeness, economy, and finally communicativeness (in 
cooperation) [Kotarbinski 1983: passim]25. From the perspective of 
optimizing ambitions of praxiology, that list may look more promising, 
than the modest set of four norms offered by Bratman. However, it may 
look suspicious as well. In what follows, I shall try to present all of these 
“norms”, critically embedding them in the context of PTI. Therefore, 
the task is to find in this Kotarbińskian jungle of concepts at least some 
grounds to extend minimal praxiology towards an optimal one.
Let us begin with the quote about purposefulness and feasibility:
“The most important feature of a good plan is its purposefulness; namely, it 
should indicate proper means to achieve a desired aim. Secondly, a good plan 
must be workable; (…). Before we perform a projected action we should have 
a good plan and know its value; however, the only way to make sure that an 
intended action is workable is to perform it. Hence unquestionable knowledge 
concerning the possibility of performing a certain plan can be achieved ex post, 
that is, at the moment when the plan itself becomes useless. There is no way out 
of it.” [Kotarbinski 1983: 25]
Kotarbiński’s purposefulness is nothing other than Bratman’s means-
end coherence. In both cases, the idea is that the means engaged should 
be suitable for the plan’s end. If one accepts its normative character, it 
should not pose further difficulties. Feasibility (or somewhat clumsy 
“workability”) appears more problematic. On the one hand, it seems to be 
a supplement of means-end coherence, because it may serve as an external 
post factum test of it. Its normative character does not seem problematic 
either: if an agent disregarded the feasibility of her plan, she could not 
expect a success of that plan. On the other hand, if we reinterpret it in 
terms of the conditions ex ante, as the thinking of normativity suggests, 
that norm seems to be the resultant of what Bratman calls internal and 
external consistency and means-end coherence (purposefulness). Why? 
If a plan is both means-end coherent and internally and externally con-
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sistent, it should be a feasible plan. At least, if an agent S plans – given 
these three conditions – to do A, it is reasonable of S to expect that her 
plan will be feasible. So, if Kotarbinski offers something close to internal 
and external consistency, this norm seems to be redundant. And that, 
I think, is the case. 
Let us consider the norm which he calls (again, a bit awkwardly) 
rationality:
“We would maintain (…), that a plan should be reasonable (...). The rationality 
of a plan, according to our understanding of the word, depends on the cognitive 
justification of its components, therefore on the cognitive justification of a plan 
as a whole. The difference between realistic programmes and utopian vagaries 
lies in that the former are based on the knowledge of facts and their relation-
ships, which precludes adventurous recklessness. It seems there is no need to 
stress that a plan can be more or less rational in this sense of the word (…). That 
is why we do not simply say that a good plan as such should be rational, but 
we maintain that the more rational a plan is, the better-ceteris paribus – it is.” 
[Kotarbiński 1983: 28]
Rationality, or cognitive justification, says even more than the norm of 
external consistency. It at one go stresses that plans should be consistent 
with our relevant beliefs, that such consistency should be optimally in-
creased, that the beliefs (with which our plans are consistent) should be 
true and also that these beliefs should be optimally justified. So, the main 
idea seems to be fundamentally in accordance with Bratman’s account, 
but it is explicitly formulated in an optimizing direction. Even Bratman 
would probably say that external consistency between a plan and a few 
random beliefs is worse than external consistency between a plan and the 
whole set of justified relevant beliefs. This shows that the understanding 
of external consistency in a more optimizing sense is viable.
Next, let us have a look at the norm which Kotarbinski calls.. internal 
consistency26:
When a plan is (…) internally inconsistent, it becomes totally unworkable. There 
is thus no controversy over whether a plan has to be consistent, or not; whether 
it can contain a project of doing something definite and, at the same time, of not 
doing it. [Kotarbiński 1983: 25].
Although imprecise, this can serve as a definition compatible with the 
one offered in PTI: a plan is internally consistent if the intentions which 
build a plan do not contradict each other. This seems correct. Kotarbinski 
immediately tries to suggest something that looks like an optimizing 
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extension of this norm. Still, this time, such an extension is not convin-
cing. According to his understanding, there are two “better” versions of 
internal consistency: harmony of a plan, where the subplans are not only 
consistent but also harmonically support themselves; and organicity, 
where internal consistency reaches its maximum in the plan structure 
[Kotarbiński 1983: 26]. I find both these manoeuvres implausible, despite 
the fact that generally speaking optimal praxiology of plans is a valuable 
option in action theory. The reason why this strategy is implausible is that 
only some plans should be in fact harmonic or organic. In most cases, 
optimal plans should be just (ceteris paribus) internally consistent. I do 
not see any convincing argument for my plan to visit California in April 
to be organic. Also, it does not become more effective or efficient when 
I combine its steps harmoniously. These seem to be only the aesthetic 
values of my plan, normatively irrelevant for its success27.
Now, we can turn back and solve the problem of feasibility. Given 
the fact that rationality, understood as the plan’s external consistency, in 
combination with its internal consistency offers the necessary and satis-
fying condition to perform – with rational expectance of success – the 
planned action, I suggest this “norm” be taken as one of the examples 
of Kotarbińskian superfluous scrupulosity. 
Let us now consider the “postulate” which seems to be close to the 
norms of internal consistency and means-end coherence. In the Treatise 
it is called consequence (or continuity)28. Kotarbiński understood it as 
a diachronic consequence between the means and end in the sense that 
some prior steps prepare future steps [Kotarbiński 1965: 119]. If we take 
this “postulate” as a norm, it happens to be redundant with respect to 
means-end coherence. The latter implies that some steps prepare other 
steps; otherwise they would not be their means. To find a way out of 
this difficulty, we should interpret it in a different manner. The idea that 
helps comes again from Bratman. Among the crucial descriptive features 
of a plan, the American philosopher points out that typically it is hie-
rarchically structured. As we recall, this means that plans “concerning 
ends embed plans concerning means and preliminary steps” [Bratman 
1987: 29]. These two issues are not identical, nonetheless, they refer to 
the same phenomenon: plans are hierarchically structured in the sense 
that they imply the consequence between means and ends: “As a result 
I may deliberate about parts of my plan, while holding other parts fixed. 
I may hold fixed certain intended ends, while deliberating about means 
and preliminary steps” (Ibid.). Therefore, my solution to the problem 
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of (diachronic) consequence is a refutation of the idea that it is a norm, 
and enlisting it into the descriptive features of a plan (as a variant of its 
hierarchical structure).
A similar problem appears when we discuss the question of plan detail. 
Kotarbiński also seemed to hesitate as to how this feature should be de-
scribed. On the one hand, he proposed that a plan should be detailed, albeit 
detailed suitably, i.e. he opted for limited detail. On the other hand,
“(…) in many cases it is more reasonable and economical to have some items 
undetermined; their determination is left to a future executor who will make them 
precise when certain important and reliable information becomes available.” 
[Kotarbiński 1983: 27]
Bratman would probably say simply that plans are partial. And, after 
merging the theory of plans in PTI (having removed the reistic “dottle” 
I discussed in section 3), I do not see any reason to interpret Kotarbiński, 
in his talk about plan detail, in a different manner than the one offered 
by Bratman. All the more as the talk about plan limited detail (or its 
partial character) is for both authors supported by the idea of the mental 
economy of a planner. Therefore, plan (limited) detail describes a feature 
of planning; that is its initial fragmentariness.
Kotarbiński noted that the problem of plan detail is analogous to 
another issue: the long term of a plan:
“(…) there are the same reasons which prevent us from determining particular 
steps of a complex action if its future conditions are not known with sufficient 
precision, and which prevent us from anticipating too many such steps. If our 
knowledge of the circumstances is too scarce, both interpolation and extrapolation 
should be limited. In some cases, therefore, we can formulate plans which reach 
the distant future, in others, those limited to the nearest future; this depends on 
how valid and how inclusive our anticipations concerning future conditions of 
the action are.” [Kotarbiński 1983: 27] 
Having replaced the talk of (limited) detail with talk of the partial 
character of plans (or their fragmentariness), we can easily get rid of the 
problem Kotarbiński describes in the above quote. If plans are partial in the 
sense that their details are underdetermined, it is clear that they are partial 
in the sense that their duration is underdetermined. Here the Bratmanian 
idea of the partial character of plans seems to be more useful, because it 
embraces these two aspects. But there are two points here. On the one hand, 
Kotarbiński, in his discussion of the detail and duration of a plan, reveals 
something that makes his approach more precise than Bratman’s, since he 
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shows two dimensions of a plan’s partial character. On the other hand, we 
should remember that both these aspects of our plan belong rather to its 
characteristic features, therefore – they are not the norms of our plan.
A different problem appears with the idea of terminus ad quem of 
a plan, i.e. the idea that a good plan has to be limited: “The terminus ad 
quem we are speaking about is the moment by which the work has to be 
done; the limitation date by which a given result has to be achieved.” 
[Kotarbiński 1983: 27]. At first glance, it seems perfectly reasonable to 
think that our plans should always have a deadline or “the expiration 
date”. Many of our actions need to be structured in this way, sometimes 
even very precisely. Still, I stipulate that it is not a typical feature of the 
plans we make. We can reasonably plan to do or achieve something, 
without having the deadline specified. Suppose I have a plan to be 
a lawyer – I cannot, strictly speaking, have a precise deadline for this 
plan. What if the deadline was set for my 30th birthday and one day after 
that date I know that my plan is not yet fulfilled completely and that 
I need one-two more years to become a lawyer? If we agree that plans 
are partial, we may abandon this problem with no regret29. 
A further issue, plan completeness, is even more problematic. According 
to this postulate, plans should be complete in the sense that they should 
“cover the whole projected action”. Yet Kotarbiński notices that it is “ap-
parently in conflict with the necessity of avoiding too detailed planning” 
[Kotarbiński 1983: 28], but it does not stop him from enlisting complete-
ness to the requirements of a plan… If this manoeuvre were to be taken 
seriously, one would judge it totally wrong. Plans are (synchronically and 
diachronically) partial, therefore they are not complete – and they should 
not be so, otherwise we would always need to overload ourselves with 
too much information (and accompanying intentions) preventing the com-
pleteness of our plan at the time of planning. This is both in contradiction 
to our mental economy (resource-boundedness) and to the Kotarbińskian 
idea of practical realism [Kotarbiński 1965: 118]. Kotarbiński appears to 
detect different descriptive features of plans, which show their importance 
in some contexts, but he has not detected any norm here.
Let us take stock. When discussing plan detail, long-term planning, 
plan deadlines and completeness, I have kept on referring to the idea of 
our mental economy. This idea touches some deeper pragmatic mecha-
nisms of our agential psychology. It is time now to take a closer look at 
the idea of plan economy30. Kotarbiński says that a plan may be economic 
in three aspects:
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economy1: a feature of planning itself, understood as plan-making
31, 
economy2: the use of plan
32: the (easy or difficult) way in which we put a plan 
into practice, 
economy3: the selection of steps and means to the chosen goal;
[see Kotarbiński 1965: 118]
Again, if we accept PTI, some problems, which result from PE and 
reism, disappear. Specifically, we can ignore economy2, since it implies 
that plans are, according to externalism, “written down”, i.e. function as 
complete recipes or instructions for actions. Let us consider economy3. 
I understand it as a substantial specification of the demand for means-
end coherence: we should adjust the progression from the means to 
an end in an utilitarian manner, in accordance with the reasons for or 
against some options. So, economy of planning, in this sense, should 
be the result of structuring character of prior intentions combined with 
relevant deliberation. If I plan to go to California from Warsaw, I should 
take a connecting flight from, say, Munich or Chicago – not from Mo-
scow or Taipei. In this context, Bratman says only that prior intentions 
are “framework reasons” which structure the process of weighing the 
reasons [Bratman 1987: 34]. If we combine it with the Kotarbińskian 
account, plan economy3 only applies to plans occasionally because it 
implies that some options are more reasonable than others, and this 
can be determined without the plan structures. To sum up, economy3 
is a more general praxiological norm, important for planners, but not 
essential for planning itself. 
Consider now economy1. What does it mean that plan-making is 
economic? Economy1 does not say anything particular about the way 
in which plan-making should be economic. Recall the principle of eco-
nomy as ascribed to actions: the fewer mental and physical resources 
it requires to reach its goal, the more economic an action is. So, here 
we are looking for the condition which might be expressed as some 
optimizing principle of our psychology of planning. Let us have a look 
in PTI. We have seen that the agglomeration of intentions has some 
distinct optimizing dimension: that building larger compound intentions 
– instead of having two separate ones – economizes our diachronic 
actions. Kotarbiński did not elaborate on the idea of economy1 when he 
enumerated three aspects of the economy of plans. Nevertheless, in the 
Treatise we can find something very interesting in this context. When 
discussing various types of action economization, Kotarbiński focused 
inter alia on doing two separate things “at one stroke”. He calls this “the 
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accumulation of results around a given measure”, and defines it as the 
use of relevant means to reach two goals which it is possible to reach 
separately by employing two different means [Kotarbiński 1965: 109]. 
And this is precisely the same idea as the Bratmanian “agglomeration 
of intentions”, but expressed in different language. One should say a bit 
more about this striking similarity between the theories of Kotarbiński 
and Bratman33, but here it is enough to emphasize that the talk about the 
economy1 of planning seems reasonable; one needs only to understand 
it properly. Kotarbiński gave only a clue to such understanding, but 
his praxiology, supported by the Bratmanian agglomeration principle, 
allows a fuller elaboration. Plan-making can be economic in the sense 
that we may agglomerate our intentions into a larger compound inten-
tion, which may function in a complex chain of intentions. Naturally, 
such economic plan-making not only economizes the processes in our 
agential psychology, but also – economizes our agency. In this sense, 
in the agglomeration of intentions, an example of economy1 can also 
turn out to be consistent with economy3
34.
Let us now consider briefly the next two issues. Kotarbinski states 
that each of these is a necessary normative condition of a good plan and 
that each appears as operativeness. According to the Polish praxiologist, 
plans as expressed sentences should be operative in the sense that they 
should facilitate and simplify the transition from conceiving their details 
to their realization. This aspect of operativeness of plans is a problem of 
the practical application of expressions of plans, so it refers to the same 
problem as economy2 (i.e. the use of plans). On the other hand, they 
should be operative in the sense that the set of intended actions should 
result in an effective action [Kotarbiński 1961: 198; 1965: 119; 1983: 
26, 28]. We can distinguish these two by calling the former external, and 
the latter – internal or immanent plan operativeness. As economy2, the 
external operativeness of plans does not belong to our area of interests, 
which is, recall, narrowed down to the sphere of agential psychology 
(PTI). It belongs to the broad issue of the pragmatic dimension of lan-
guage35. Immanent plan effectiveness, as Kotarbiński noticed, should be 
a result of meeting all the requirements that effective or efficient plans 
have to meet. It seems clear that the latter is not a substantial praxiological 
norm; it depends on the other demands on a plan. What is more – it is 
typically context-dependent. So, operativeness in both senses does not 
seem to be interesting in our PTI-oriented approach to the praxiology 
of planning.
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Before considering the very last norm of planning, we should discuss 
shortly the question which has been touched on in the two previous 
paragraphs, namely the problem of the communicativeness of a plan. 
When planning becomes intersubjective, when several agents want 
to reach one and the same goal, the plan content must be expressed 
in an easily understandable language, it must be readable – “not in 
the linguistic sense, but in the sense that the schedule of the action in 
question is clearly perceived” [Kotarbiński 1983: 29]. Therefore, the 
only difference between the external operativeness and economy2 and 
the communicativeness of plan is that the latter implies a cooperative 
action, while the former does not. I agree with Kotarbiński that it is an 
important aspect of acting together: if I am to cooperate, I should like 
to know that the other cooperating agents understand what we are to do 
together. Still, it seems that it is not a problem typical for PTI, namely, 
for the future-directed intentions which build a plan (even if a plan is 
realized in shared actions)36. This is a problem for PTI only as extended 
to the theory of collective action: the latter may require other conditions 
than the former describes. 
Finally, let us consider the last – but not the least important – norm of 
plans: plasticity (or flexibility). According to Kotarbiński,
“Every plan deals with future events, therefore at the moment we formu-
late it we do not know all the circumstances which will accompany them. 
Hence a plan must leave room for some uncertainty and conjectures con-
cerning the course of events and states of affairs assumed by projected 
actions. And what if things happen otherwise? In order to cope with such 
a situation a plan should indicate, or at least admit of, certain modifications of 
its schedule; it should contain nothing which makes a modification of this sort 
impossible; nothing should prevent switching from one track to another. The 
less a plan contains elements which obstruct its possible modification, the more 
versatile it is.” [Kotarbiński 1983: 26]
This rings true, but it is rather a metaphor. It states only that plans 
should be flexible in the sense that a plan should allow for modifications 
in the means, because of possible changes in the environment of a plan-
ner. Discussing plasticity in [1962a] Kotarbiński was more verbose. He 
said that a plan should be underdetermined with respect to the means 
which allow me to realize it. Such underdetermination may come in two 
versions. The first (let us call it soft underdetermination) relies on the 
“lax alternativity of steps”: the means are optional in the alternatives 
which we accept with respect to two possible planning scenarios that 
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may later appear. Turn back to my plan to visit California in April. Sup-
pose, that I have a subplan to meet a friend in Sacramento, but – due to 
his anticipated move to LA, I am not sure if he will be in Sac or in LA. 
I need to include two scenarios for my overall plan: the subplan of going 
to Sacramento and the subplan of going to LA. Softly underdetermined 
plans require two-tracked planning. The second version (call it hard 
underdetermination) is different. It leaves the means to the plan end 
completely open and optional; the means may be employed liberally 
according to the information about the environment [Kotarbiński 1962a: 
195]. The same plan for April: I have a subplan to meet a friend, but 
(suppose), he is currently on the job market, and I know only that he has 
four offers from Californian universities (and he has not told me which 
ones). In April he will move to one of the university cities. So, because 
of the “amplitude of options”, my plan to meet a friend in California 
should be hard-underdetermined. 
It is interesting that plasticity of planning easily fills in the lacuna of the 
Bratmanian account of PTI. Before I explain this in detail, let me make 
a few remarks about underdetermination. Firstly, the plan underdetermi-
nation to which Kotarbiński refers to piggybacks on the idea of the partial 
character of plans, but in the case of plasticity, such fragmentariness 
(both synchronic and diachronic) is deliberate: a planner consciously 
and liberally uses her knowledge to devise more than one scenario for 
his overall plan. Secondly, plans are undetermined semantically37: the 
connections between intentions (as plan states) are underdetermined with 
respect to the partial character of plans and to the responses of a planner 
to the possible fluctuations in the environment. In other words, if plans 
are chains of future-directed intentions, the semantic relations between 
them cannot stiffen the plans, otherwise our planning would inertially 
lead to practical errors whenever our plan environment fluctuated. Now, 
what is the lacuna in PTI I have mentioned?
As we remember, Bratman’s discussion of plan stability is narrowed 
down to the case of “nonreflective (non)reconsideration”; he did not 
explore the problem of the simple abandonment of intentions in the plan-
ning structure. Kotarbińskian plasticity helps explain this problem away 
– what is more, it does it in a Bratmanian spirit. The idea is that plasticity 
enters the scene of our actions whenever there is the abandonment of 
future-directed intentions. More precisely, we may safely abandon our 
decisions about what to do in the future if we are plastic planners. So, plan 
plasticity, much alike plan stability, is also a thesis about an important 
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aspect of our agential psychology. Elsewhere (Makowski, submitted), 
I have tried to frame planning plasticity as a meta-stability of intentions, 
moored in the same stabilizing dimension of our psychology; such dimen-
sion works differently in different planning ecosystems. Bratman shows 
in detail how we retain our stability (as reasonable) in stable practical 
environments. Kotarbiński’s plasticity corrects his account in the sense 
that it shows, that psychological diachronic stability changes when our 
environment fluctuates. Consequently, the overall force of the picture of 
stability Bratman gives has to be critically supplemented by our support 
of plasticity. Elsewhere (Makowski, submitted), I have tried to construe 
such a support. I pointed to three issues: (1) plasticity, as a way to retain 
the meta-stability of our intentions, helps avoid the inertial aspects of 
our planning and practical errors which may result from it. (2) Plasticity 
stabilizes our planning when we have to simply abandon some practical 
scenarios. This results in substitutes and surrogates in our subplans or 
in the reframing of the whole plan, but it always helps retain some more 
general practical tendencies we initially had in our planning. (3) Plasticity 
warns us against taking the idea of resource-limited agency too literally. 
Bratman took it as an argument for the importance of stability: we are re-
source-limited creatures, so it pragmatically supports nonreconsideration 
of prior intentions. Still, agents with limited mental and physical resources 
may be plastic planners: to have two-tracked planning scenarios or to 
be ready to modify or adjust a plan when needed – these psychological 
tendencies require some imagination and knowledge, but are compatible 
with the account of resource-limited agents. Thus, generally, Kotarbiń-
skian plasticity is sound and may be combined with PTI.
7. Conclusion: the grammar of planning 
I have tried to arrange here a kind of “conceptual meeting” of the so 
called planning theory of intention and the praxiological account of plans, 
and I have given a brief comparative discussion of the two. This proved to 
be demanding for both. It revealed serious difficulties, especially on the 
side of praxiology (reism, PE, redundant characteristics), but they were 
not unsolvable. Despite the fact that “the philosophical communication” 
between PTI and praxiology is hard, its overall outcome appears to be 
fruitful: after modifications and critical reinterpretations, they mutually 
support one another. As I suggested at the beginning, they work in the 
same business. This business can be called (to travesty Kotarbiński) the 
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grammar of planning. The main result of the discussion I have proposed 
is as follows: despite many intra-theoretical problems, praxiology has 
something important to say about the features and norms of planning. 
PTI, on the one hand, helps to reframe praxiology, but, on the other hand, 
it reveals a few deficiencies, which can be easily removed. 
To sum up: PTI and praxiology (after some corrections in both cases) 
agree that plans are complex but typically partial chains of future direc-
ted intentions, which are structured hierarchically. Praxiology is also 
competent to specify the way we should understand the partial character 
of plans, and, in this sense, it interestingly enriches their descriptive 
characteristics. 
PTI and praxiology differ in their understanding of the demands that 
planning has to meet. Bratman pointed to four norms, which all govern 
plan states: means-end coherence, internal and external consistency, 
reasonable stability and agglomeration. Praxiological perspective, after 
merging with PTI, could not embrace the idea of reasonable stability, but 
it added the fifth norm, plasticity. This norm reveals its role only on the 
level of complex planning in unstable environments. Still, it unveils the 
aspects of our psychology which are crucial to being effective agents. 
Praxiological thinking also shows that the principle of agglomeration 
of intentions is a type of broader praxiological norm, which can be cal-
led economization. Even these two ideas show, that there are tangible 
advantages to the praxiological approach to planning. If my arguments 
(which have been given largely as a reinterpretation of Kotarbiński), 
are sound, praxiology should be taken seriously in action theory. There 
are at least three reasons to take it seriously: firstly, it offers substantial 
enrichment of the account of planning. Secondly, it shows the reasons 
for extending the theory of plans in an optimizing direction. Finally, it 
may also enhance action theory in a broader sense, since it explicitly 
orients practical philosophizing towards effectiveness and efficiency. In 
this way, it proves to be still vivid and worthy of detailed examination 
– especially when one faces the fact that the very anchors of praxiology 
are in Kotarbiński’s writings, which appeared totally outside mainstream 
action theory in the early 50s and 60s.
We may now turn back to the idea I have been referring to throughout 
the text – that praxiology remains interestingly close to the conception 
of resource bounded rationality. True, praxiology does not take this idea 
at its “face value” (as Bratman’s PTI seems to take). It shows critically 
where being economic really matters: to be still effective, to get things 
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done, we sometimes need to engage more resources (more energy, more 
imagination, more knowledge – and sometimes more money) than initial-
ly predicted. But it does not mean that effective agency requires unusual 
resources: effectiveness and efficiency in actions are normally available 
for resource-limited creatures like us.
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It is only worth noting that the praxiological understanding of efficiency and 
economy is much more basic than the one used by economists, since it does not 
imply quantitative measurement.
5. Compare: “By praxiology I mean the science of efficient action. Consequently, the 
tasks of praxiology are to formulate and to prove recommendations concerning 
what must be done: what is advisable to do under definite circumstances in order to 
attain the intended results in the most efficient way. To put it more briefly, the task 
of praxiology is to investigate the conditions on which maximization of efficiency 
depends. It is superfluous to add that the formulations given above cover both 
positive recommendations and warnings and the avoidance and eliminations of 
effects that disagree with our intentions as well as of all shortcomings of efficiency 
in action” [Kotarbinski 1962b: 211].
6. One of the important ideas behind Kotarbiński’s project was to show why we need 
explicit and thoroughly elaborated praxiology. I shall not discuss the problems 
connected with this idea here.
7. In this way praxiology enters the debate on the problem of know-how.
8. For exhaustive presentation of Kotarbińskian reism, see [Smith 2006].
9. At least, the one of Davidsonian proveninence.
10. Technically speaking, a nonfactualist would say that sentences about plans do not 
assert propositions putatively expressed in these sentences (in other words, plans 
as symbolic images express no proposition; they are not genuine representations 
of a putative domain of facts). One could try to save this conception by employing 
fictionalism and so called “quasi-assertions” in the spirit of Bas van Fraassen’s 
constructivism (see e.g. [Kalderon 2005, Rosen 2005]), but this is a different 
matter. 
11. In Makowski (unpublished), I defend the view that Kotarbińskian approach literally 
reifies agency and it cannot serve as a feasible ontological basis for action theory. 
But, at the same time, reism made some interesting shifts in action theorizing to 
the effect that occasioned praxiology is, to some extent, still terra incognita in the 
philosophy of action.
12. To remain precise, it would be worth noting that the reistic understanding of 
plans is holistic in the sense that it tries to capture both the processes of planning, 
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the agents involved and the artifacts (used as tools, and produced as effects of 
planning). Cf. “According to concretism, reality consists exclusively of changing, 
four-dimensional, that is, spatio-temporal, solids; what temporal plans refer to are 
objects of this sort and their temporal phases. In particular, objects of this sort 
can be identified with acting persons, what they produce, substances used, or the 
wholes consisting of acting persons, their tools and substances they use. Therefore, 
a temporal plan of an action, for example, a plan of a journey, describes (…) the 
temporal sequence of shorter actions which are constituents of the complex action 
we deal with; strictly speaking, such a plan gives a detailed account of a journey: it 
begins with the phase when a whole which includes passengers, drivers, carriages, 
undergoes a change (e.g., it moves from A to B), and is followed by another phase 
of the same whole, then by still another, and so on” [Kotarbiński 1983: 24].
13. In this part I use characteristics I give in Makowski (submitted).
14. One might object that this is the essence of PTI: “future-directed intentions” and 
“plans” may be used interchangeably, because both illuminate themselves. But 
notice, if this is what Bratman would like to say, then the talk of plans as built 
of intentions is void. It would also bear other serious intra-theoretical problems. 
In what follows, I shall try to show some advantage in taking the difference in 
complexity between intentions and plans seriously. In “Intention inertia and the 
plasticity of planning” (Makowski, submitted) I accept the same strategy to high-
light the problems in the Bratmanian construction of the norm of stability.
15. That feature, by Bratman called sometimes “inertia”, is, in turn, a result of more 
general psychological propensities. Bratman treats all these similarly (I show the 
virtues of accepting more precise distinctions in (Makowski, submitted)).
16. Kotarbiński was perfectly aware that such planning exists. But – no surprise, given 
his reism – he interpreted it in a completely different way: “Somebody may make 
fantastic plans concerning his life; he rather lets his thoughts wander capriciously 
than seriously considers how to live” [Kotarbiński 1983: 22].
17.  For a concise presentation of functionalism in philosophy of mind, see e.g. [Levin 
2013].
18. How these norms are to be conceived is a complex issue. To simplify, here I accept 
the uncomplicated talk of normativity in action, which can be defined roughly as 
something the ignorance of which results in practical errors.
19.  Here I summarize Bratman’s thoughts which have been repeated in many places; 
in this summary I ignore a few historical nuances of how this set of norms evolved 
in his writings [compare, for example: Bratman 1987: 3-32, 2009: 159].
20. See my (Makowski, submitted).
21. Cf. “I will be making the simplifying assumption that an agent abandons a prior 
intention only as a result of some form of reconsideration of that prior intention. 
(...) In an earthquake I might just abandon my prior intention to play bridge tonight 
without engaging in anything that amounts to reconsideration of that intention” 
[Bratman 1987: 183, n1].
22. In his three essays on temptation [see Bratman 1999b, 1999c, 2007a], Bratman 
declared that he changed his view about stability for a less „default“- and more 
control-oriented rational one. In Makowski (submitted) I claim that his modified 
view has no impact on the overall picture of stability Bratman offers in his later 
works.
23. If I intend now to go to California in April and I intend now to have a glass of 
Californian cabernet sauvignon tonight, these two intentions do not play in the 
same game and do not have a common practical scenario.
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24. Zhu offers more detailed support for intention agglomeration and defends it 
with regard to some criticisms. His account, however, focuses on the rationality 
of agglomerating intentions, and leaves their praxiological dimension without 
explanation. See [Zhu 2010].
25. Similarily to Bratman’s approach to planning norms, this set evolved in Kotarbiń-
skian action theory. Here I offer a synthetic approach mainly on the basis of the 
1956 paper, including also some clarifications from [Kotarbiński 1962a, 1965], 
without going into differences between their expositions.
26. In the Treatise Kotarbinski calls internal consistency the unity or (synchronic) 
consequence [Kotarbinski 1965: 119], and waives to give even an imprecise 
definition.
27. By saying this, I do not claim that aesthetics does not matter at all in our actions. 
In some practical contexts, it may be very important or even crucial. The point is 
only that it is not important praxiologically, i.e. in terms of general norms.
28. It is absent in [Kotarbiński 1962a and 1983].
29. Note that one might respond that the idea of terminus ad quem can be explained 
away by saying that it is simply redundant: a plan has its terminus ad quem iff it 
contains the additional future-directed intention which specifies the deadline of 
that plan.
30.  Also absent in Kotarbiński [1962a and 1983]. 
31. Precisely, Kotarbiński spoke of plan „formulation“, but this can be reinterpreted 
– according to the strategy accepted here – in psychological terms.
32. This aspect should not be confused with „the use of plan” in the sense of Martha 
Pollack: i.e. the functional roles of plans. See [Pollack 1992].
33. This is a further reason to interpret and enrich PTI praxiologically, and the oppo-
site – to reframe praxiology in terms of PTI.
34. To reduce two senses of plan economy, one could offer a kind of „Simple View” on 
the economy of planning, which would state that if A makes a plan economically, 
A’s actions which result from this plan are economic (at least in some sense). This 
view is a generalization of the idea that agglomeration of intentions has agglo-
merating effects in actions. This generalization is only a hypothesis. Although its 
consequences are interesting and far-reaching, I leave it here unexamined.
35. There already exists a specific field in praxiology, which investigates the grounds 
of such problems. It is called the theory of optimal sign or praxiosemiotics and 
has been proposed by Tadeusz Wójcik.
36.  It seems that agents involved in effective cooperation do not need to have the same 
plan (in terms of sharing future-directed intentions which build that plan) to act 
in accordance with that plan: cooperation does not require shared intentions and 
their semantics. I leave this problem for another study.
37. I understand semantic underdetermination broadly in Recanati’s sense, as 
a dependence on pragmatic factors [Recanati 2002]. The view that plans are un-
derdetermined this way I proposed in (Makowski, submitted).
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